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Introduction 
 
It is often put forward that parties do no longer differ from each other when it comes to their 
proposed policy intentions. Since Kircheimer (1966) launched his well-known catch-all thesis it is 
generally agreed that there is an ideological convergence between political parties. In an attempt to 
seduce a larger part of the electorate, parties have polished their sharp ideological positions and 
replaced them for softer, less explicit points of view. But to what extent is this assumption also true 
for the Flemish political context? Are there no longer clear-cut ideological differences between 
Flemish parties?   
 
Recent discussions in Flanders raises suspicions that there still exist remarkable ideological 
differences between political parties. This certainly looks to be the case on socioeconomic matters. 
The way politics should deal with the current economical crisis, revealed an old fashioned ideological 
debate between the major liberal (Open VLD) and social democratic party (SP.a). Different politicians 
of Open VLD were expressing their concerns about the budget deficit and rejected uncontrolled 
deficit spending while social democratic politicians defended a traditional Keynesian policy to solve 
the crisis (De Standaard, 20/03/2009). 
 
Judging from what these politicians say it seems that nothing really changed and that both parties 
still support the positions they traditionally did on socioeconomic matters: social democrats are pro 
government intervention while liberals want to reduce state intervention. Which automatically raises 
the question if the Kircheimer thesis of decline of ideology can be fully applied to Belgian politics. 
What is his hypothesis worth if two parties that are each other’s historical antipodes on the 
socioeconomic dimension persist the same ideological distance as they used to do? 
 
In this paper we will test the validity of Kircheimers convergence hypothesis for the Flemish liberal 
and social democratic party on the socioeconomic dimension between 1978 and 2007. The 
socioeconomic cleavage is the dimension on which both parties are theoretically each other’s 
opposites. In other words, possible convergence on this cleavage can be considered as extremely 
relevant. In a second stage we want to do an even more extreme test by excluding the impact of the 
least ideological issues (e.g. the amount of money spent on education)  on the calculation of the left-
right position by only analyzing core issues of both parties: (reduction of) taxes for the liberal party 
and (the extension of) social security for the social democrats. This are issues they own: policy areas 
on which they have a good reputation and their opponents don’t. It are issues that belong to the core 
of both ideologies. Therefore we may assume that changing positions on these core issues would be 
the ultimate alternative for parties. If even in these policy areas, issue owners and their antipodes 
leave their original position (e.g. liberal parties defending taxes or social democrats defending tax 
cuts), we may speak of true convergence.  
 
Theory 
 
Convergence 
 
Continuously scholars are questioning the existence of various ideologies. The idea that the 
ideological differences between political parties decrease is a belief that has been around since the 
1940’s. The underlying thought is often that class differences have come to an end. Which means 
that if ideological convergence is to occur, this certainly should be visible on an isolated 
socioeconomic dimension which is the incarnation of socioeconomic  differences.  
 
The concept of ideological convergence stems from a train of political philosophers that can be 
united under the slogan The End of Ideology based on the essay of the same name written by Daniel 
Bell (1960). Bell gave this movement of thinkers a face but the idea he managed to put so catchy into 
words with the appealing title of his bestseller The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political 
Ideas in the Fifties, was already living for a long time amongst several scholars. In the 1940s and 
1950s James Burnham, Albert Camus, Herbert Tingsten, George Sabine, Thomas Humphrey Marshall 
and Raymond Aron1 already suggested that ideology would become irrelevant (Sanders 2008:63). But 
it was Bell’s publication that really cranked up the discussion. After Bell different political 
philosophers kept on claiming the end of ideology (e.g. Lyotard 1979; Kolakowski 1990; Fukuyama 
1992) and fostered the conjecture of a centripetal electoral competition.  
 
Downs substantiated this idea of ideological convergence in his famous work An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957). He started from the median voter theorem first proved by Duncan Black, which 
states that the median voter's preferred policy cannot lose  in elections against any other. Downs left 
from this idea and  for his spatial model of a two party system and predicted that parties would 
converge to the policy positions of the median voter. That is where most of the votes are. According 
this rational choice theory parties only care about winning elections and therefore try to get as many 
votes as possible. Since most of the votes can be gathered in the centre of the electoral spectrum it is 
rational for parties to converge to that  centre. As a result political parties would no longer differ on 
ideological basis.  
 
Kircheimer (1966) came to the same conclusion in his well-known article on catch-all parties. 
According to him, the mass integration party with clear-cut ideological points of view based on the 
class struggle, evolved to a catch all party. After WW II class differences were growing less apparent 
as a result of economical growth and the introduction of the welfare state. Everything the mass 
parties struggled for appeared to be realized which made it necessary to broaden their electoral 
pool.  The cadre parties had the same reaction and understood that they could no longer only 
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concentrate on the establishment. Therefore cadre and mass parties decided to broaden their party 
programmes and distanced themselves from the old ideological positions they once defended. 
“Socialist parties in Europe, for example, abandoned the harsher dictates of Marxism and 
emphasized instead the welfare state. Similarly, the British Conservative party abandoned its cries for 
laissez-faire capitalism and quietly supported a mixed economy” (Jackson 1997:316).     
 
Kircheimer developed his theory more than forty years ago but even recent party models point in the 
direction of the declining ideological differences between parties.  According to Katz and Mair (1995) 
the heyday of the catch-all party is over and we have now entered a new fase in the evolution of 
parties with the breakthrough of the cartel parties. Does this mean that party convergence is no 
longer the case? On the contrary, party programmes become more similar and competition between 
parties is less than before. Political parties collude and “become agents of the state and employ the 
resources of the state (the party state) to ensure their own collective survival” (Katz & Mair 1995:5).  
 
Finaly, especially interesting for our research question, is The Third Way (1998) of Anthony Giddens. 
This leftist scholar stressed the importance of the use of (neo)liberal ideas to achieve socialist aims 
which means that market forces are not prompt put aside as a recipe of capitalists, but integrated in 
a broader social project. State intervention is no longer the only satisfying formula. E.g. a reduction 
of payroll taxes is a measure that would certainly please companies but is possible as long as it 
generates more work. His analysis of social democracy had strong effects on centre-left political 
parties in Europe and the world. It was well received by political leaders like Blair, Clinton and 
Schröder and It is generally assumed that their electoral success convinced other left politicians to 
chose for the third way also.  This means that we may expect that the social democratic party in our 
research may be influenced by the ideas of Giddens. In that case SP.a should be the motor of the 
ideological convergence that may occur.    
 
Enduring divergence 
 
In spite of the multitude of scholars who suggest converging ideologies, the continuous differences 
between political parties is supported in equal numbers.  Downs himself already made a subtle 
distinction between parties in a two-party and multiparty system. Whereas in the first parties 
converge to the position of the median voter, “parties in a multiparty system try to remain as 
ideologically distinct from each other as possible.” (Downs 1957:115). A hypothesis which was 
confirmed by other scholars (Cox 1990). The fact that Downs model only works under very specific 
conditions (e.g. two-party system, single round election for any office, the election chooses a single 
candidate…)leaves a lot of space for possible divergence (Grofman 2004).   
 
But Downs proximity model was not only subtle approached by the theorists above, moreover it did 
not match the empirical reality it tried to explain because contrary to the theory’s predictions, in 
two-party systems, parties simply do not converge (Macdonald & Rabinowitz 1998:281). This 
nonconvergence is sometimes explained by the pressure of party activist who are generally 
ideological purists (Aldrich 1983a, 1983b, 1995), other authors refer to the presence of primary 
systems (Davis et al. 1970). Macdonald and Rabinowitz (1998:291) refer to the importance of valence 
issues for politics and relate this to the fact that parties that did well in government are advantaged 
on these issues. In that case the opposition has a valence deficit and has to create a distinct enough 
image to attract electoral support. The result is “a fairly consistent divergence that would ebb and 
flow based on the degree of advantage, with a tendency for advantaged parties to move toward the 
median and disadvantaged parties away from the median voter.” (Macdonald & Rabinowitz 
1998:291). In other words Macdonald and Rabinowitz argue that it is not rational on the long term 
for parties to settle in the ideological centre because those parties don’t have loyal voters and 
unstable grassroots support.  
 
Another well-known analysis of Downs’model comes from Budge (1994). His critique on the 
convergence hypothesis is based on the fact that is assumes fully informed voters and political 
parties. But parties have imperfect information about the position of the median voter which makes 
that they keep distance or just move little by little because they do not want to lose the votes they 
already have. Enelow and Hinnich (1984) already emphasized this incremental way of changing party 
positions and argued that the moving space of parties is limited. E.g. a social democratic party leader 
can’t all of a sudden change from pro trade unions to an anti position on this issue.  
 
There are not only doubts about Downs proximity model, the  ideological dimension of Kircheimers 
catch-all thesis has also been questioned. In his study on the catch-all party in Western Europe 
Krouwel (1999:140) rejects the idea of a centripetal electoral competition: “There is no linear 
development towards convergence of political parties, instead polarization and convergence 
alternate over time in all European party systems.”  This result is confirmed by Budge and 
Klingemann who see nothing more than ‘trendless fluctuations’ (2001:19). 
 
A pacified socioeconomic cleavage: the decline of class differences and the general acceptance of a 
mixed economy 
 
Belgian political history was dominated by three cleavages which lay the basis for the Belgian party 
system. The oldest one is the antithesis between church and state and the community question is the 
youngest one. In between political life was mainly dominated by the socioeconomic cleavage.  This 
last cleavage is the object of our research and therefore we  make use of what is understood in 
Belgian politics when we utilize the term socioeconomic cleavage. This means that in this paper  the 
socioeconomic cleavage is composed of two oppositions: more vs. less state intervention in the 
economy and the  defense of workers and those who are underprivileged vs. privileges of the rich 
and enterprises. These oppositions have weakened a lot after WWII as a result of two evolutions: the 
decline of class differences and the overall acceptance of a mixed economy where socialist and 
liberal ideas about the economy are combined. 
 
Let us first have a look at the decline of class differences. This evolution is often seen as an important 
factor in the debate about the ideological convergence of political parties. The clash of interests 
between employers and employees has lost its sharpness during the last fifty years.  An important 
explanation for this evolution is in the reduction of the working class. In Europe the amount of 
industrial workers has decreased by a third in the second half of the 20th century while the middle-
class knew an explosion (Dogan 2001:94). Since interest articulation is one of the most important 
functions of a political parties we may expect that they leave their most extremist points of view 
behind and sing a softer and more centrist tune on socioeconomic topics in their party manifestoes. 
This does not only count for leftist parties, but also for conservative parties that may regard the rise 
of the middle class as an opportunity to seduce a larger electorate by promoting more centrist 
policies.  
 
The general acceptance of the mixed economy is a second evolution that brought peace on to the 
socioeconomic cleavage. From 1945 until today almost all West-European countries had a mixture of 
state intervention and market economy with alternating periods in which one of the paradigms 
played the leading part. Broekhuijse (2007) distinguishes three periods: the golden age of social-
democracy between 1945 and 1973, the end of social-democratic consensus with the breakthrough 
of neoliberalism between 1973 and 1991 and finally the age of a new social-democracy. 
 
After WWII the idea that capitalism would bring prosperity was no longer defended by large groups 
in society. Instead there was a general acceptance that there was room for state intervention in the 
economy or a social-democratic consensus as Dahrendorf called it. The position and the role of the 
state was remarkably extended.  It did not matter whether the social democrat Schmitt, the liberal 
d’Estaing, the conservative Heath or the republican Nixon were in power. They all went out from 
Keynes economical model with its emphasis on state intervention. "We were all followers of Keynes”, 
Nixon once said (Broekhuijse 2007:118).  
 
The end of the social-democratic age begins around 1973 with the economical crisis. According to 
Dahrendorf the traditional social democratic paradigms were called into question and as a result 
neoliberalism wit its own paradigms could break through in the 1980’s (Broekhuijse 2007:22). The 
mixed economies stayed upright, but the economic policies noticeably more bore the stamp of the 
market economy.  State intervention got a more negative connotation and in some countries (e.g. 
Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher) it was even totally rejected.  
 
In the nineties in a lot of European countries social democratic parties were winning elections. But 
according to Dahrendorf this did not mean that state intervention worked itself back into the 
economic policy of the West-European states as it did before. Social democracy had undergone a 
metamorphosis and integrated (neo)liberal ideas into its economical programme. E.g. the state 
should support enterprises through tax cuts, avoid budget deficits and limit social security to its basic 
facilities (Broekhuijse 2007:129-130). 
 
We may assume that the breakthrough of the idea of a mixed economy had a centripetal effect on 
the party manifestoes, but  the emergence of neoliberalism  in the seventies and eighties and the 
integration of liberal ideas by social democratic parties in the nineties may have caused fluctuations 
in the ideological distance between parties. This is probably less the case for the influence of class 
differences on party manifestoes since the decrease of the amount of industrial workers showed a 
more lineair trend. In France in 40 percent of the people who had a job were industrial workers in 
1992 this was shrunk to 27 percent (Dogan 2001:94). This constant reduction of the working class 
never knew a setback that could cause a sudden increase of ideological differences. But according to 
Adams (1999) and Merril and Adams (2001) this does not mean that class is no longer an explaining 
factor for existing differences between parties. They argue that class differences are still big enough 
to restrict the tendency of convergence.  
 
Methodology and data 
 Data 
 
For our research we will analyse party manifestoes. Several scholars criticised these documents (e.g. 
Schattschneider 1942:567, Rose 1984:65, Mudde 1995:208). But the figures of the most renown 
research tradition that draws on party programmes, the Manifesto Research Group (MRG), are used 
by several authors for the most diverse studies in the most prestigious journals (Laver, Benoit and 
Garry 2003:311). Thus, manifestoes may be considered as a reliable source for ideological research.  
 
We will only analyze the manifestoes of the liberal OpenVLD and social democratic SP.a partyi and 
only on matters belonging to the socio-economic cleavage. This is the dimension on which both 
parties are theoretically each other’s opposites: the former defends state intervention in socio-
economic matters, whereas the latter is seen as a supporter of the free market. The socio-economic 
cleavage also contains the issues that belong to the core business of both parties. In other words, 
possible convergence on this cleavage can be considered as extremely relevant.  
 
The period of this case-study (1978 – 2007) covers the breakthrough of neoliberalism in the eighties 
and the heyday of the third way in the second half of the nineties. This means that we may expect 
social-democrats and liberals to diverge at first and converge afterwards. Until 1999 both parties did 
not want to govern together. They only made an exception of five months to solve the community 
question that had paralyzed Belgium during the seventies and both joined the tripartite government 
Martens III (1980). The first government Verhofdstadt I (1999-2003) made an end to this mutual 
exclusion. For the first time since  1954-1958 both parties governed together in a purple-green 
cabinet. The considerable differences seemed to belong to the past and this was confirmed as  
second purple coalition, this time a pure one, took office under Verhofstadt II (2003-2007).  Under 
these ‘extreme’ purple conditions, we could expect a contagionii effect between liberals and 
socialists. It seems a natural thing that parties who worked together for such a long period, start to 
resemble a bit each other. This means that the political context was very fertile for ideological 
convergence to happen. 
 
Method 
 
By counting quasi-sentences and placing them in categories, policy positions were estimated.iii 
Therefore we made use of the expert-coding scheme designed by Laver and Garry (2000) with a few 
adjustements to the Belgian context. The result is a coding scheme that differs from the traditional 
MRG-scheme in two ways. First it is more fine-grained than the traditional MRG-scheme, which 
makes it possible to do an in-depth research of the socio-economic cleavage. In the second place it 
uses tripolar categories instead of unipolar ones. 
 
The main reason for using the scheme of Laver and Garry instead of the traditional MRG-scheme is 
the fact that it is more fine-grained. The MRG-researchers designed a coding scheme wit rather 
limited and broad categories. With regard to the socioeconomic cleavage it concern categories as 
‘economic goals’, ‘incentives’ and ‘regulation of capitalism’.  The limited amount of categories is 
defendable because of the international comparative motives of the original MRG-researchers. A 
limited amount of categories makes it more easy to manage the immense amount of data that is 
under research but an important drawback is that lot of nuances tend to disappear in an attempt to 
aggregate the complexity of the political discourse. The MRG-scheme e.g. does not have a separate 
category on taxes. A category on taxes with subdivisions on income taxes, payroll taxes, taxes on 
company profits, VAT and taxes on capital is essential for this specialized research. The position of 
parties on taxes is an important issue in the socioeconomic debate. All the more since we may 
suppose that taxes is one of the issues on which social democratic parties have positioned 
themselves more to the right since the third wave of the nineties.  This example shows that we have 
to integrate more detailed categories in our coding scheme if we want to do an in depth study of the 
socio-economic dimension. This is also acknowledged by MRG-researcher Budge (2001:90): “ an 
authoritative general coding scheme for party policy positions does not always serve more 
specialized concerns within the policy field (…) Specialized investigations may well need their own 
specialized codings” (Budge 2001, p. 90). The fact that this research involves only two parties makes 
a more profound and labour-intensive analysis practicable.  
 
Next to the fact that the coding scheme that is used here is more fine-grained, it also uses tripolar 
categories instead of unipolar ones. The MRG research method is based on the saliency theory of 
party competition according to which parties compete by emphasizing those topics where they feel 
they have a good reputation and not by suggesting opposite positions. Because direct confrontations 
between opposing policy stands are rare according to the MRG researchers, their scheme does not 
contain confrontational categories.  Bipolar categories are not needed because ‘emphasis equals 
direction’ according to Budge (1999). Not everyone agrees with Budge, on the contrary several 
scholars assert that the distinction between emphasis and position/direction is fundamental 
(Kleinnijenhuis en Pennings 2001:162 en 180; Shikano en Pappi 2004:2-6; Rabinowitz en 
Macdonald:1989). Moreover Benoit en  Laver (2006:66) point out that the MRG-scheme  is not the 
pure salience-scheme the MRG researchers suggest in their theoretical discussions: “It is a positional 
coding scheme in which many of the potential positional categories have been censored in advance 
on the basis of the empirical expectations of the scheme’s designers”. Based on the idea that most of 
the important political issues are valence-issues, the MRG researchers dropped  either the pro or con 
position in advance. This was at least the purpose, but nevertheless in contrast to the theory, the 
MRG-scheme contains pro and con categories. This is because even within the MRG not everyone 
was convinced of the saliency approach: “Scepticism on the part of certain members of the 
Manifesto Research Group at the very beginning of the coding operation resulted in ‘pro-con’ 
codings being put in for certain issue areas where confrontation between parties was thought most 
likely” (Budge 2001:78).  
 
Despite the fact that the division between position and emphasis is less rigorous in practice than 
often suggested, the amount of positional categories in the MRG-scheme is limited and Budges 
statement that direction equals emphasis stays upright. Laver does not automatically want to accept 
this assertion and does not belief that information on policy emphasis is enough to determine the 
position of a party before this is empirically tested. Laver does not want to make this a-priori 
assumption. Nevertheless Laver acknowledges that Budges statement that emphasis equals direction 
is true for some issues: “There may well be a particular set of issues for which ‘direction equals 
emphasis’” (Laver 2001:73). But this is not always the case Laver says: “We have also seen, however, 
that there is another class of issue for which there may be extreme disagreement on substantive 
policies between actors who each hold the issue in question to be highly salient. In such cases, issue 
emphasis provides no systematic information about policy position.” (Laver 2001:73) That is why 
Laver suggests to code texts on both components: position and emphasis. 
 
The socio-economic left-right scale is defined as: 
 
  SocEconLR = (SocEconR – SocEconL) / (SocEconR + SocEconL)iv 
 
Next to the pro and con category Laver suggest to make a neutral category and to code in a tripolar 
way in order to code every quasi sentence, even those that are not clearly pro or con a categorised 
issue. By making the sum of all pro, con and neutral quasi sentences we can figure out the emphasis 
of an issue. This method has the disadvantage that the inflation of categories may lead to more 
arbitrary decisions made by the coding experts (Budge and Laver 1992). This can be solved by using 
well defined categories with clear-cut limits.  
 
The figure below is an excerpt of the coding scheme we used for this research.  The revised 
manifesto coding scheme counts 129 separate categories on socio-economic issues and is 
hierarchically structured with broad policy domains at the highest level. Within these broad domains 
(e.g. taxes, social security…) the coding scheme has different branches. As we can see below the 
domain on taxes is divided in income taxes, payroll taxes, taxes on company profits, sales taxes and 
taxes on capital.  
 
Figure 1: Section of revised manifesto coding scheme 
 
1112 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes 
Increase taxes 
(General statements supporting  the need to increase taxation, which do not belong in any of the 
somewhat more specific categories 11121, 11122, 11123, 11124. Includes need to defend current 
taxation levels against demands for taxation reduction, the need to fight fiscal fraude and 
statements supporting the idea of taxation as a mechanism of re-allocating) 
 
 11121 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes/Income 
 (Income taxes, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction) 
 
 11122 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes/Payroll 
(Payroll taxes, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction) 
 
 11123 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes/Company 
(Taxes on company profits, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction) 
 
 11124 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes/Sales 
(VAT or other sales taxes, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction) 
 
 11125 +STATE+/Budget/Taxes/Payroll 
(Taxes on capital, support increases or defend levels against demands for reduction) 
 
 
Results 
  
In their overview of the evolution of party positions on the left-right scale in 25 western democracies 
Budge and Klingemann also analyze the Flemish situation between 1978 and 1995 (2001:42). Since 
1978 the ideological distance between all the parties has decreased considerably. The convergence 
has taken such dimensions that since 1991 the social democrats and liberals take about the same 
position on the left-right scale. But this does not automatically mean that this is also true for their 
positions on the socioeconomic cleavage because the left-right scale used by Budge and Klingemann 
(2001:22) is a broad scale which contains categories that go beyond socioeconomic policy (e.g. 
military: positive, peace, decolonization, Law and order, democracy, freedom, constitutionalism, 
internationalism…).  It is possible that the convergence they found was mainly the result of liberals 
strongly emphasizing democracy or social democrats stressing the importance of human rights which 
are both not socioeconomic issues. But even if we restrict the analysis to the socioeconomic 
cleavage, which is the cleavage on which social democrats and liberals are traditionally antipodes, we 
indeed find proof convergence (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Ideological distance between SP(.a)  and (Open)VLD between 1978 and 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the ideological distancev between SP.a and Open VLD decreased in the period 
between 1981 and 2007. In 1981 the interval between both parties ran up to 1,689 but a quarter of a 
century later only half of that distance remained.  This downward tendency is not linear but shows 
some ups and downs in the period 1978 and 2007. What strikes the most is the giant leap in 
ideological distance between 1978 and 1981. In figure 3 we can see that this increase is mainly the 
result of Open VLD taking a far more right position. The shift to the left of SP.a is peanuts in 
comparison to the move to the right of the liberal party. In three years and one election Open VLD 
evolves from its most left position in the period that was under research to its most right position. 
This radical shift can probably be explained by the breakthrough of neoliberalism in Open VLD which 
had a large following in the young generation of liberal politicians that took over the party at the end 
of the seventies.   
 
Interesting in figure 3 is that the converging trend on the socioeconomic cleavage is mainly the result 
of the liberal party getting more left on these issues. The liberals leapfrog and make big shifts on the 
socioeconomic cleavage whereas the social democratic party holds a rather stable position on the 
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left during the whole period that was under research. Only in 1987 and especially in 2003 SP.a made 
a clear move to the right. The impact of the third way on the socioeconomic politics of the party 
seems to be less than expected. The cartel with the moderate liberal party Spirit for the elections of 
2003 and the contagion-effect that arose as a result of governing with the liberal party between 1999 
and 2003 may have had a bigger impact.    
 
Figure 3: The evolution of Flemish social democrats and liberals on the socioeconomic dimension 
between 1978 and 2007. 
 
 
 
As described above the convergence seems to be a fact and is mainly the result of the liberal party 
getting more to the left. This is an interesting result because it suggest that convergence even occurs 
on the cleavage where parties are each other’s natural antipode. In a second stage we want to do an 
even more extreme test by excluding the impact of the least ideological issues on the calculation of 
the left-right position by only analyzing core issues of both parties. Therefore we will take a look at 
the evolution of party positions on taxes and social security. 
 
If we take a look at the salience of both subjects, the results confirm that parties emphasize the 
issues they own more than their opponents. The liberal party emphasizes taxes a lot more than the 
social democratic party. With an average of 21% Open VLD dedicates three times more quasi-
sentences of its socioeconomic program to taxes than SP.a. The same can be said about ‘social 
security’ that is especially popular in social democratic manifestoes. But different from the tax issue 
is the fact that the contrast between both parties is a lot smaller. Between 1981 and 1987 the 
amount of sentences dedicated to social security is almost the same for both parties while they 
defend complete different positions. A finding that seems to contrast with the saliency theory of 
party competition which states that emphasis equals direction. 
 
Figure 4: Degree of emphasizing issues of social security in relation to the socioeconomic program 
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But to what extent do both parties converge in a positional way on both issues? If we consider the 
issues on taxes (figure5) we can see that the liberal party stays rather stable on the right while the 
social democratic party alternates positive with negative scores. If Sp.a  takes up a right position on 
taxes this is mainly the result of a right position on income taxes or payroll taxes. This are the 
categories that stimulate convergence when it comes to taxes which is in contrast with taxes on 
company profits and taxes on capital where the SP.a  always takes a left stand.  
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the positions on taxes 
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Where the converging tendency is rather limited in the domain of taxes, this is not the fact when it 
comes to social security. This is the result of the Open VLD moving to the left on this issue and Sp.a 
moving to the right. The elections of 1999 seem to be crucial in this evolution since that was the year 
when the liberal party positioned itself as a left party for the first time when it comes to social 
security becoming almost as left as SP.a.  After 1999 the liberal party shifted back to a less left 
position but the distance between Open VLD and SP.a remained quite small because the social 
democrats moved along with their ideological antipode.  
 
If we look to the more detailed categories within social security we see that the categories ‘general 
statements on social security’, ‘health service’ and ‘pensions’ evolve in the same way as social 
security in its entirety which means that these are the categories that cause the convergence. On 
matters of child support and support for the unemployed positions stay very much the same during 
the period under research. On the first matter both parties almost always take a left position while 
the support of unemployed leads to totally opposite positions until 2007. In that year the social 
democrats for the first time agreed on a strict policy towards the unemployed but they emphasized it 
a lot less than the liberal party did. 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the positions on social security 
 
 
 
Finally we would like to draw the attention to the fact that the positioning of both parties on social 
security as well as on taxes shows a similar course in both graphs. It looks like the parties don’t like to 
change their position on the issues they ‘own’ and that the occurring convergence is mainly the 
result of the other party, that is not seen as the owner of that issue, changing its position. In concrete 
this means that the liberal party which is often associated with the taxes does not feel the urge to 
change its position on an issue where it possesses a large credibility. The social democrats seem to 
have less difficulties to change their position on this issue. Probably because they are not 
automatically associated with taxes and therefore their core identity is not threatened if they shift 
positions on this issue. The same conclusion may count for social security but then the other way 
around with the social democrats in the role of the party holding on to its core identity and the 
liberal party as convergence facilitator.  
 
Conclusion 
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Our analysis of the party manifestoes of the Flemish liberal and social democratic party between 
1978 and 2007 reveals that parties even converge on those issues where they are each other 
antipodes. The ideological distance between SP.a and Open VLD on the socio-economic cleavage has 
continuously decreased since 1981. But in 1978 the distance was bigger than in 2007. This means 
that periods of convergence alternate with periods of divergence. Anyhow we see that the liberal 
party adjusts to the international context of neoliberalism and then slowly shifts back to the 
ideological centre. The position of the social democratic party on the other hand is less dynamic. Sp.a 
keeps a stable position on the left and seems to experience minimal influence of the third way 
ideology. But when we look more into detail we can see that the social democrats are also moving 
and tend to take a more right position on taxes and social security since 1999.  
 
This immediately brings us to the finding that parties even converge in policy areas that are typically 
ascribed to one party such as taxes and social security. But this convergence is limited in a sense that 
that the positional shift of the issue owners themselves is not big but it are particularly their 
opponents who facilitate the convergence.  
 
To conclude we would like to join Budge (2001:90) who said that “specialized investigations may well 
need their own specialized codings”. Apart from the concrete research question we hope to have 
proved that it stays interesting to analyze manifestoes with alternative coding schemes and methods 
instead of always relying on the traditional methods. In that sense we would even like to fine-tune 
the coding scheme of Laver and Garry by introducing a weight for some quasi sentences because  “an 
intention to introduce an annual Wealth Tax, has different implications from a promise to raise old 
age pensions.” (Rallings 1987:3). Rallings says this in the context of research on electoral promises. 
Hij asserts that a controversial promise is more difficult to realize than an ordinary promise that is 
done in a party manifesto. Thus the  degree of controversy should have an influence on the 
realisation score. This same conclusion can also be made in the context of the method that Laver and 
Garry use to calculate the positions of parties on the left-right scale. Are all proposals or quasi 
sentences  of a program of the same weight if we want determine the position of a party? Is a party 
that wants to invest more tax money into education not less left than a party that wants to introduce 
a Wealth Tax?  
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i
 Open VLD is formarly known as PVV and VLD. SP.a is formarly known as SP.a-Spirit and SP. 
ii
 Expression taken from Thomas (1980). 
iii
 For a more detailed description of this researching method see Volkens (2002). 
iv
 The result is a score between +1 (extreme right) and -1 (extreme left). 
v
 We become the ideological distance by making the sum of absolute values of the left-right position of both 
parties. 
